U-763

Intro

As noted in their respective biographies, other than the successful U-126 attack, the most significant event of Rowland’s and Wilmer’s tours was the unsuccessful attack on U-763 on February 5th during which they were nearly shot down.

Because of that, I wanted to dive a little deeper into this event to understand exactly what had occurred and how close it had been.

Uboat.net continued: “He left U-103 for U-boat commander training at the 24th Flotilla and in August 1941 he took command of the type VIIC U-boat training boat U-560 until July 1942. He then served as a liaison officer for the commander of the Luftwaffe Fliegerführer Atlantik, the German Air Force equivalent to RAF Coastal Command.”

As far as his new command, U-763, Cordes chose a prancing unicorn for its emblem. He and his new crew spent the next year training in the Baltic Sea which included stints at specialized Anti-aircraft school in Swinemünde (Present day Świnoujście in Poland) in April and October 1943, which as you’ll read, provided huge dividends.

For anti-aircraft weaponry U-763 went from the early war standard of a single 20mm on the conning tower (like Coumbis and Rowland faced with U-126 and U-154) to two twin 20mm known as a ‘Flak Zwilling’ on the upper deck of the conning tower (port and starboard) and a quadruple 20mm known as a ‘Flak Vierling’ on the lower platform.

Combined, these weapons generated a withering amount of anti-aircraft fire capable of shredding Coastal Command aircraft unlucky enough to get caught in their sights.

This required a new much larger conning tower, which necessitated the removable of the 88mm anti-ship deck gun forward of the conning tower. At this time airpower was the greatest threat and it was far too dangerous for U-Boats to stay surfaced and engage vessels with their previous arrangement of weaponry.

For radar detection, U-763 was equipped with the latest unit called FuMB 7 “Naxos”, which replaced the “Metox” U-126 had been equipped with and could detect the new British ASV Mk. III radar 172 Squadron and most of Coastal Command was then using. To counter the Naxos, 172 Squadron (and others) started to use the radar only periodically for short intervals, so as to not spook the U-Boats into crash-diving too quickly. From detection to attack would typically take between 5-10 minutes of flight-time, however a U-Boat could crash-dive to a safe depth in about 30 seconds. As you’ll read, the German’s noticed the intermittent use of the radar.

After the deployment of Naxos, like the previous Metox, sightings and attacks dropped dramatically and crews reported many “disappearing contacts”, frustrating the Coastal Command crews.

Finally, they were equipped with the new FuMO 61 “Hohentwiel” search radar. It was extremely rare for U-Boats to be equipped with Radar until this stage. Range was estimated as 10km (6.2 miles) against ships and 20km (12.4 miles) against aircraft, although in his war diary summary review, Cordes was criticized for not using it as he feared it would reveal his location.

Cordes was promoted to Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant Commander) on Sep 1st, 1943.

While Cordes was technically a rookie Front-boat commander, as you can see, he had years of varied experience including several war patrols with two of the most successful commanders of the war, substantial training and the latest and greatest technology the German’s had to offer.

The Patrol Begins

U-763 departed Kiel, Germany at 8:00am on December 14th, 1943 on their first war patrol in the company of U-314 (Basse), U-957 (Ohling), U-965 (Schaar) and U-1060 (Brammer). U-763 was bound for its future operating base of La Pallice in occupied France with the 3rd U-Boat Flotilla.

First, they stopped briefly in Kristiansand, in occupied Norway just before midnight on December 16th, to take on more supplies and make a few repairs.

They departed early on the 17th and nearly fired on one of their own Junkers JU-88’s who failed to provide a recognition signal.

On Christmas Eve the war diary notes:

“Shortly before the midday meal a small Christmas celebration in the control room, reading of the invocation by the Oberbefehlshabers [ES: Commander-in-Chief of the U-boat force, Karl Donitz] and small Christmas presents for the men in the Kommandant's room.”

Typically, these first patrols were designed to be offensive in nature and they would operate along the convoy routes between Iceland and Greenland. They joined Wolfpack “Rügen 3” between December 28th and 31st, although the war diary reveals that Cordes and U-763 were primarily assigned to gather weather data in this area and he did not sight or engage any targets of opportunity.

They experienced some very bad weather (as to be expected this time of year in the North Atlantic), as high as Degree 8 on the Douglas Sea Scale (waves 9.00–14.00 meters/29.5–45.9 feet) and freezing temperatures.

On the morning of December 30th they noted:

“Repair of the starboard twin [ES: 20mm anti-aircraft weapon] (installation of a new shoulder support, that had been torn off by the Sea).  Afterwards check firing of the port weapon.”

These weapons experienced regular submersion in salt water and when surfaced faced salt water spray and ice at this time of year. It is no wonder that their reliability suffered under these harsh conditions.

On the evening of January 7th U-763 had their first encounter with an enemy aircraft. They identified it as a “Lerwick”, which was a British twin-engined flying boat made by Saunders-Roe, but also note that it was equipped with a searchlight. The Lerwick’s were not fitted with searchlights and in fact by this stage of the war were already declared obsolete and withdrawn from front-line service. It was more likely a Consolidated PBY Catalina on long-range convoy escort duty.

The Catalina made three approaches, the last and closest at 3,000 meters at which point U-763 opened fire. This was beyond the weapon’s effective range and no hits were observed and the aircraft turned away after dropping a flame float. This lucky aircraft/squadron has not been identified.

On January 21st they finally had a respite from the heavy seas (but still very cold), and overhauled the Flak Vierling and tested all weapons.

They spotted another flying boat on January 22nd, but it was at extreme range on the horizon and they avoided by turning away.

They performed a check fire on the starboard twin 20mm on the 24th and the following day performed overhaul work on all the anti-aircraft weapons and check fired the port twin 20mm.

On January 26th they began their “return” transit to France and by February 3rd had reached the outer Bay of Biscay where things began to get very interesting. Over the course of the next 2 days U-763 fought off 4 aircraft attacks, three of which I’ll summarize and I’ll detail the one by Churton Rowland and crew of 172 Squadron.

First Attack – 53 Squadron

No. 53 Squadron had an interesting history over the course of the war (see here), flying a variety of aircraft, in a variety of roles from bases all over the map. In January of 1944 they moved to St Eval in Cornwall as part of Coastal Command 19 Group, now flying the American-made Consolidated Liberator. These were modified by the British for anti-submarine duties and designated as the G.R. (General Reconnaissance) Mk. V equipped with ASV Radar. They were also equipped with a version of the Leigh Light mounted under the starboard wing, although for this first attack it was not needed.

The first attack occurred at dawn on February 4th. According to 'U-BOAT VERSUS AIRCRAFT’ by Norman Franks and Eric Zimmermann:

“Liberator ‘F’ of 53 Squadron (BZ795) [based at St. Eval] had taken off on a Percussion R3 patrol at 2230 hours on the night of the 3rd and found the boat.

At 0811 the next morning a message to base advised: “Am over enemy submarine in position 4530/0700.” And that was all. In a fierce action to the north-north-east of Cape Finisterre, the Liberator did not pull out of its attack run and crashed into the sea, clawed down by accurate gunfire from the U-boat. The pilot had managed to drop his D/C’s but no damage was done.”

The entire crew of 9 perished:

Flight Lieutenant Deryck Addison Bell, age: 25, RAFVR (60573), Pilot, Panel 201

Sergeant Vernon Trevor Alan Patey, age: 20, RAFVR (1215935), 2nd Pilot, Panel 235

Flight Sergeant John Owen Lewis, age: 24, RAAF (A.416972) – Bomb Aimer, Panel 261

Flying Officer Norman John Williams, age: 28, RAAF (A.420791) – Navigator, Panel 258

Flight Sergeant Sydney George Hill, age: 27, RAAF (A.422557) – WOP/AG, Panel 260

Sergeant John Walter Churchman, age: 22, RAF (551818), Panel 227

Flight Sergeant Ernest John Fowler, age: 26, RAAF (A.422163) – WOP/AG, Panel 260

Sergeant Reginald Donovan Howard, age: 28, RAFVR (946434), Panel 231

Sergeant Charles Lidgitt, age: 28, RAFVR (1583827), Panel 233

All are inscribed on the Runnymede Memorial, Surrey, England (Panel Numbers noted).

The Squadron’s Summary of events noted that Bell (and perhaps his entire crew) had just recently joined the squadron.

U-763’s War Diary describes the engagement as such:

“0819 (Position BF 4975) "Aircraft!"  Immediately before diving aircraft was reported bearing 310°T in approach.  Course 90°, about range = 8000 meters [4 – ½ miles], altitude 200 meters [65 ½ feet], level flight.

0820 "Naxos" detection (3 short detections).  Enemy turns and flies toward the boat at low altitude from port astern.

I decide due to the low range to remain on the surface to defend.  At range = 3000 meters [just under 2 miles] fire opened from all barrels and turned away hard to starboard and ahead GF [ES: GF = “Grosse Fahrt” or ¾ speed, which for the type VIIC was 16.73 knots].  Enemy turns away slightly to port and flies at about range = 3000 meters parallel to the boat.

0824 Outgoing Radio Message Beta Beta 0825/4/75:

Was attacked by aircraft.  Naval square BF 4888.

"U-763"

(First after the dive it was determined that the radio room had encoded an incorrect square.  The square must be BF 4988.)

0826 Enemy turns away to port and holds far off for the next approach.

0829 Enemy flies towards the boat from port astern at low altitude again (altitude = 50 meters [164 feet]).  Boat again goes to ahead GF and turns on opening fire away hard to starboard.

Enemy (type Liberator Consolidated 32) with American markings [ES: daytime correct identification of aircraft type, but curious comment about American markings] returns fire with on board weapons and gets hits in the coning tower cladding and port side.  No personnel casualties.  Own hits in the wing and in center of the fuselage.  Spurts of flame and smoke development observed.  Aircraft - after throwing bombs (6 to 8 units), that fall at about 120 meters [131 yards] distance abeam to port (high wall of water) - puts itself on the inner curve, shoots with on board weapons and thereby offers a good target.  Flies off to about 5000 meters [just over 3 miles].

0840 Aircraft turns to starboard for a new approach.

0841 (position BF 4988) "Shoot down!"  Aircraft tips over the burning right wing and explodes on impact.  Parachute jumps not observed.  Due to increased air danger and favorable flying weather (medium-high broken cloud deck; bright day; Vis. good) I decide to dive immediately.

0845 "Crash dive!"  to depth 60 meters.

Nothing more was distinguished at the shoot down location with binoculars.  I must also accept that the enemy had transmitted and decide therefore to dive without running to the shoot down location.  It would be desirable for the boat to have information about the enemy-frequencies in order to identify a call for other forces immediately.

The combat role suggested for the boat by the Swinemünde Anti-aircraft School proved itself (uninterrupted ammunition supply).  Shooting all weapons in sea and weather conditions was very beneficial.

Great joy over this "consolation prize"!”

It is assumed that this last sentence was in reference to not sinking any ships on this patrol.

While Bell’s attacks were clearly persistent and courageous it is unclear what they hoped to achieve in their third and ultimately fatal attack as they had already dropped their load of depth charges and at best could only perform a strafing run for which they were clearly out-gunned.

As noted, it was interesting that the German’s described the Liberator as having American markings. BZ795 began life as a B-24D-5-CF with the U.S. Serial Number 42-63818. It was part of a large batch of 31 Liberator’s converted to G.R. Mk. V’s.

These were armed similar to the GR Mk. III with one nose .303 in (7.70 mm) Browning machine gun, two in each waist position, and four in a Boulton Paul tail turret similar to that used on the Handley Page Halifax. The Martin dorsal turret was retained.

I was hoping to find the Form 78 Movement Card for this specific aircraft, but to no avail. My working theory is that it had only recently been delivered and the demand for aircraft was so urgent they had not yet had time to re-paint it from U.S. Army Air Forces olive drab over light gray to Coastal Command camouflage over white.

Second Attack – 53 Squadron

The second attack occurred about 17 hours later in the early morning hours of February 5th. Again, according to 'U-BOAT VERSUS AIRCRAFT’ by Norman Franks and Eric Zimmermann:

“The following night she [ES: U-763] was found by another 53 Squadron Liberator (BZ815 ‘D’ – P/O L.L. Esler RCAF) in position 4527/0654 at 0135 hours. It was picked up by the boat’s ‘Naxos’ equipment and although on an ASR [ES: Air-Sea Rescue] sortie looking for the Bell crew, it homed in on the sub and released its D/C’s. Flak fire put a few holes in the Liberator’s tailplane.

The crew of the Lib also picked up two more U-boats, and reported this to base, but in reality, they were picking up Aphrodite decoys sent off by U-763 which would give the radar operator multiple radar images. Boats using these tried to hide amongst the aircraft’s radar contacts, hoping the searching aircraft would line up on one of the decoys and not them.”

Details from 53 Squadron’s Record of Events notes:

On February 4th, 1944 Liberator V (Leigh Light) ‘D’ BZ.815 departed St. Eval at 1755 hours on an Air-Sea Rescue mission in the Bay area at 1,500 feet average height to search for Bell’s crew lost in the previous attack.

This crew was comprised of:

Pilot Officer L. Esler, RCAF, (J.18738) - Pilot

Pilot Officer J.L. Knight, RAFVR

Warrant Officer W.R. Kinsman, RAAF (A.409148)

Flight Sergeant R.J. Crompton, RAAF (A.410956)

Flight Sergeant A.W.G. Brown, RAFVR

Sergeant D.M. Holden, RAF

Sergeant T.W. Ellison, RAF

Warrant Officer R.C. Lauer, RCAF (R.122619)

Flight Sergeant F. Clegg, RNZAF (NZ.417197)

The Record of Events describes the patrol as follows:

“As this was primarily an Air Sea Rescue Search only 6 250 lb DC’s were carried as a base load. At 0135 following a Radar contact at 7 miles a U/Boat was sighted and attacked with 5 depth charges; the sixth hung up. The U/Boat’s wake was straddled 50 feet astern at 90°. Intense flak was received from the U/Boat which continued on its course and remained on the surface. A few holes in the tail plane was the only damage to the aircraft.

A second U/Boat was almost immediately sighted [ES: Not possible, or same one or perhaps they meant via radar], marked and reported and a further radar contact then obtained which was considered to be a third U/Boat. Homing procedure was ordered and carried out to P.L.E. [ES: Prudent Limit of Endurance] when the aircraft set course for base, leaving the U/Boats still on the surface. No dinghy was sighted [ES: from Bell’s crew].”

They returned safely to their base at St. Eval at 0856 hours after a patrol of 15 hours and 1 minute. No personnel casualties were reported, although a Sergeant I.H. Neilson replaced Knight and Flight Sergeant A.F. Murray replaced Ellison going forward.

Liberator BZ.815 was back in the rotation as of February 8th. Esler and crew’s next sortie was the evening of February 12th/13th in Liberator BZ.875.

Note that as this was intended as an ASR sortie, only 6 D/C’s were carried instead of the typical 8, probably for increased range/loiter time. In addition to the longer range these 4-engine Liberators offered, that extra power allowed them to carry a larger payload and because of that, under the right circumstances, had the ability to make two attacks of 4 D/C’s apiece if needed instead of just one attack of 8.

The squadron’s Summary of Events for February also notes:

“P/O Esler had a further adventure towards the close of the month. When on patrol to the S.W. of Ireland he was investigating a contact with the Leigh Light when he was heavily engaged with one of our Naval Units. His port inner engine was smashed by a heavy A.A. shell and his aircraft was momentarily unmanageable. When almost in the sea he recovered control and brought his damaged aircraft safely home to effect a successful landing on two wheels.”

U-763’s War Diary describes the engagement as such:

"0106 (position BF 8135) Surfaced to charge and ventilate.

N 2-3, Sea 1, 9/10, 1035 mb, cloud height 600-800 meters, Visibility medium, moonlit night behind the clouds.

[ES: Wind from the North at Beaufort Scale Force 2-3 or light breeze at 1-6 knots, Douglas Sea Scale Degree 1 indicates calm, rippled surface with virtually no waves, 90% cloudy/overcast, Normal Barometric Pressure, clouds at 1,968.5 – 2,624.8 feet, the rest is self-evident]

0135 (position BF 8135) "Aircraft!"

"Naxos" detection; 2 short impulses at an interval of 4-5 seconds, with Volume 5.  As the report comes to the bridge, light already bearing 310°T the searchlight of an approaching aircraft.  Altitude 100 meters [328 feet].  Boat turns hard to starboard, both diesels 2 x HF ahead.  (charging cruise) [ES: 2xHF = 2x “Halbe Fahrt” or double 3/5 speed which for the type VIIC was 14.24 knots].  Aircraft passes boat on the port side abeam distance 100 meters.  Fire opened immediately.  Hits [on the aircraft] not observed.  Enemy turns away to port and quickly passes out of sight.

0138 "Naxos" detection.  3 short impulses with Volume 5, tone level 1000-1100.

0138 (position BF 8135) Enemy in sight!  In level approach from abeam to starboard, approximate course 150°.  Altitude 100 meters.  Opened fire.  Enemy attacks bombs in trail (6-8 bombs) and throws flares.  The boat turning hard to starboard was not overflown, the bombs fall in the water 200-300 meters [219-328 yards] on the port side.  Hits [on the aircraft] observed.  No on board weapons [ES: of the aircraft] shot.  Aircraft (probably type "Lancaster") [ES: another mis-identification] immediately pulls into the clouds.  No searchlight used on this approach.

0140 Outgoing Radio Message Beta Beta 0140/5/87:

Was attacked by aircraft.  Naval square BF 8136.

"U-763"

The grid location was repeated incorrectly.

I decide to man the "Aircraft" watch stations and continue charging cruise.

3 "Aphrodite" launched.

0141 Roaring loud "Naxos" detection (only a short impulse).

0145 3 short impulses, steady Volume.

0146 2 "Aphrodite" launched.

0150 Came to course 180°.  To get away from the area where the flares were thrown."

Third Attack – 172 Squadron

The third attack occurred just minutes after Esler’s in the early morning hours of February 5th. Again, according to 'U-BOAT VERSUS AIRCRAFT’ by Norman Franks and Eric Zimmermann:

“Not long after this event, the boat was located by Wellington ‘M’ of 172 Squadron (HF282), in position 4539/0640. An attack was met by more gunfire, hits being scored in both wings and fuselage by canon shells. After the attack, the D/C’s exploding astern, the Wellington climbed away, the pilot having difficulty due to some damage to the tail, so he broke off the action and headed for home."

This crew was comprised of:

1st Pilot/Commander: Flying Officer Churton Stewart Rowland

2nd Pilot/L.L. Operator: Flying Officer Albert “Bert” Mason

Navigator: Flight Sergeant J.R. Pledger

WOP/AG: Warrant Officer John “Jack” F. Wilmer

WOP/AG: Sergeant G.B. Schwinge

WOP/AG: Sergeant E. Oliver

The 172 Squadron’s ‘Record of Events’ describes the patrol as follows:

2/4/44 – 2/5/44 Wellington Mk. XIV M/172 (HF282)

Up: 23:20 Down: 06:20 Duration: 7 Hours even

"Chivenor. At 0206 hours position 4539N, 0640W had radar contact 90° green 6 miles. Homed to investigate and on turning sighted to port two red lights with flak coming from water between them. Homed on to flak, and on approaching sighted four lights (1 flickering and 3 steady). On investigation, the wake of a surface vessel was sighted ½ mile to port. Being too close to attack, the aircraft circled and then obtained radar contact on to which Aircraft was homed. The Leigh Light was switched on at ½ mile and a fully surfaced U-Boat was sighted and attacked, the 6 Depth Charges straddling U-Boat’s track 135° green. The nearest Depth Charge fell 25 feet away from stern of U-Boat. The usual messages were sent to Group, and as both wings and fuselage near emergency exit had been holed by canon shells, the aircraft set course for base. Average height 1,000 feet. (Percussion M2 patrol)"

For this attack I also reached out to the British National Archives at Kew to see if they still had the more detailed ‘UBAT’ or ‘U-Boat Attack Assessment Form’, which fortunately they did. It reads:

“On Anti-Submarine patrol, flying on track 165° [ES: South, southeast] at 1000 feet, in weather 10/10 cloud, base 2000 feet [ES: completely overcast above 2000 feet], sea moderate, visibility 10-15 miles, wind 330° 10-15 knots [ES: from North, northwest, so a tail wind], obtained Radar contact bearing Green [ES: Starboard/right side] 90° range 6 miles. As aircraft was turning to starboard to home on contact two white lights with red pyrotechnics between them [ES: Likely anti-aircraft fire from U-Boat, but they didn’t comprehend this] were seen from rear turret. Aircraft turned to port to investigate lights. After turning 4 lights were seen, of which one was flickering as if sending morse [ES: mis-interpreted foil streamers from Aphrodite buffeting in wind or perhaps more gunfire].

Aircraft circled lights three times and captain was about to illuminate position when, at 1000 feet, sighted wake bearing Red [ES: Port, left side] 45° distant ½ mile. As wake was too close for an attack aircraft turned off to starboard, the wake being kept in view by rear gunner. When wake disappeared, aircraft turned back again to attack.

At 1 mile radar operator [ES: possibly W/O John F. Wilmer] gave bearing Green 10°. Aircraft was now on track 060° [ES: northeast] at 100 feet and at ½ mile searchlight was switched on illuminating U-Boat on surface, in position 45° 35’ North, 06° 47’ West, course 90° 10 knots.

Aircraft attacked from Green 130° to U-Boat’s track releasing from 75 feet 6 Mk. XI Torpex depth charges, set to shallow depth, spaced 60 feet while U-Boat was on surface. As soon as searchlight was switched on U-Boat opened fire and aircraft was hit in three places during the approach by cannon shells. Navigator [ES: F/S John R. Pledger] replied with fire from front gun.

After attack aircraft turned to port and evidence states that depth charges exploded 25 yards astern of U-Boat, first and second depth charges straddling U-Boat’s track. Owing to darkness results of attack were not observed and as aircraft was damaged and difficult to fly, captain set course for base.”

Beside the detail offered in the UBAT, these reports also include a sketch of the attack:

My observations on the sketch are as follows:

1. In the sketch of the attack, the action begins in the upper left, showing the aircraft flying south, southeast on course 165°.

2. The first “X” notes: “Radar contact Green 90° 6 miles”

3. It shows them turning to the right, and the second “X” notes: “R/G [Rear Gunner] sighted lights”

4. After that it shows them looping around to the left and circling 4 “Lights”, which were actually the Aphrodite decoys.

5. The third “X” noted: “Sighted wake Red 45° ½ mile”

6. It then shows them looping around to the left to get into a better attack position, and the fourth “X” notes: “Radar [Contact] range 1 mile Green 10°”

7. Beyond that is a sketch of a circle with rays on the right side representing the searchlight being turned on with “L/L [Leigh Light] at ½ mile”.

8. Above that is a sketch of the U-Boat on track/course of 90°, and you can see red streaks labeled as “Flak” [aka German anti-aircraft fire] coming from the U-Boat’s conning tower.

9. The six red dots are the six depth charges, showing the closest two near the U-Boat’s stern.

10. Finally, it shows the Wellington’s track turning off to the northwest to head home.

U-763’s War Diary describes the engagement as such:

"0156

Came to course 130°.

0159

Enemy in sight astern to starboard in level flight, altitude 500-600 meters.  Range = 1200-1500 meters.

I have the enemy in my binoculars and order:  "Do not shoot!"  I see a "light cluster" which quickly falls to the water.  It is a new floating light marker.  6-8 bombs are noted as short impacts [ES: no other aircraft or attacks are known to have occurred].  Enemy must have detected the "Aphrodite".  Continued to move off on easterly course.

02.03

"Naxos" detection, 1 short impulse.  Course changed again to 170°.

02.04

3 "Aphrodite" launched.

02.08

"Naxos" detection, 1 short impulse, Volume 5.  Enemy in sight astern to starboard at 400 meters [1,312 feet] altitude in level flight.  No searchlights.  Aircraft cuts across the wake 100 meters [328 feet] astern and was shot at with all barrels.  Malfunctions in both twins.  Flares thrown.  Hits [on the aircraft] observed.  No bombs thrown.  No on board weapons [ES: of the aircraft] shot.

02.09

Again a short impulse, Volume 5.

02.10

Again came to course 130°.

02.12

"Naxos" detection, one impulse, Volume 5.

02.13

Searchlight bearing 300°T.  Enemy in low flight astern to starboard, altitude 15 meters [49 feet], range = 800-1000 meters [875 – 1,094 yards], searchlight remains on.  No dazzling effect, especially glaring, bluish light.  Boat turns away hard to starboard.  Fire opened, however only a few shots take place, because malfunctions are reported from all weapons, which had already occurred repeatedly during the first two approaches.  On board weapons shot; 1 man (ammunition passer) [ES: unidentified] lightly wounded by splinters. Light markers thrown.

02.14 KM Grid BF 8139

Enemy turns to port shortly before reaching the stern and throws 5 bombs in train, that fall in the water at a distance of 100-150 meters [109-164 yards] on the port side (time ignition)!  On board weapons shot from the stern turret and cockpit [ES: nose].  Hits heard in the boat [ES: .303 machine gun rounds pelting the hull of the U-Boat].

The enemy, on which hits were observed, quickly passed out of sight on the port side.

02.15

Outgoing Radio Message Beta Beta 0215/5/88:

Was attacked by aircraft.  Naval square BF 8217.

"U-763"

Due to the large evasion maneuvers of the boat an incorrect sub square was mistakenly sent."

The UBAT also included an analysis by D.V. PEYTON WARD Captain R.N. who reviewed all U-Boat attacks:

“I think there were three U-Boat’s in the neighborhood (as reported by D/53 at about 0215). The lights may have been from one of these U-Boats. I agree that it would have been better to stick to the first radar contact. It was luck and a sharp pair of eyes which picked up the wake and I think aircraft ought to have gone further away before turning and homing on. As it was, the attack was too rushed and resulted in not sufficient allowance being made for speed of U-Boat and from the evidence a miss astern resulted.”

The UBAT included additional comments by K.S. LLOYD Air Cmdrs. For S.A.S.O., Air Staff, Headquarters Coastal Command:

“This Ubat report gives an excellent example of the type of snap decision likely to be required of the captain of an Anti-U-Boat aircraft at any time. In the light of information at present available when simultaneous contacts are obtained on lighted and unlighted targets, the correct action will always be to investigate the unlighted targets first.

In this attack, the change of decision had two probable consequences:

i. The aircraft flew close to the U-Boat and raised the alarm thus enabling the enemy gunners to be ready for some accurate shooting as soon as the searchlight came on.

ii. The actual approach was too short to enable a good homing to be carried out and thus a bad bombing run was made.

Although A.S.V. jamming was reported in the Ubat report, there is no trace at this H.Q. of the full “Daisy” report called for by Coastal Command Signals Staff Instruction No. 105. There should be no need to stress the importance of sending accurate reports on any jamming experienced; the whole night effort may be affected by experiences such as this.”

Their assertions that there were multiple U-Boats present we now know was incorrect. This was partially based on a report by “D/53” which was Liberator ‘D’ of 53 Squadron flown by P/O L.L. Esler (RCAF), who had attempted to attack U-763 about 30 minutes earlier, but was also fooled by the new Aphrodite Radar decoys.

I believe they were probably correct that Rowland and crew should have stuck with the first radar contact and that it was luck that the Rear Gunner spotted the wake while they were messing about around the decoys.

They were also technically correct that once they spotted the wake they turned too soon, which put them too far behind the U-Boat on their approach and forced them to adjust to a too shallow of a course. Rowland’s methodology was sound but timing was off a little.

This was further exacerbated by dropping from too high (75 feet). Ideally, they were supposed to drop from 50 feet, so the higher elevation made the depth charges carry long and basically overshoot.

Before I saw this report, my assumption is that they dropped too soon, and the depth charges fell short. Something quite common, especially while receiving accurate anti-aircraft fire. I think they had nerves of steel and dropped when they should, they just happened to be a little too high and on an untenable course (again a factor of turning too soon and forcing the attack). 

It is important to remember that depth charges are designed to work in pairs. It is the shockwaves from the two closest explosions that are meant to crack the U-Boats pressure hull. Ideally, you want this to happen directly across from one another at 90° to the U-Boat’s track like a cross (+). What they call a straddle. The more the aircraft’s course aligns with the U-Boat’s the steeper the angle and the further apart, or more offset, those explosions occur, reducing their effectiveness. In this case, even if they had passed directly over the U-Boat instead of behind it, at that angle, the depth charges would have likely just shaken them up but not been enough to sink them.

If not for the U-763’s weapons jamming, perhaps in part thanks to the recent action with 53 Squadron, the crew had faced the very real prospect of not returning as the U-boat’s gun crews had them dialed in for range and elevation and were scoring hits.

Luckily the engines were not hit, but it must have been a nerve-wracking time with every vibration and change in engine note they must have feared the possibility of a night-time ditching in moderate seas. I also image with a hole punched in the fuselage it was quite loud and extra drafty. The damage to the aircraft control surfaces on the wings and tail must have made ‘M’ for Mother a handful. Rowland, likely with Bert Mason’s help, managed to nurse their damaged Wellington the four hours back to Chivenor and they landed safely at 6:20 as the sun rose. It must have seemed like an eternity.

We now know at least Wilmer was psychologically scarred from this event.

Fourth Attack – 502 Squadron

The fourth attack occurred about 22 hours later as midnight neared on February 5th. Halifax ‘R’ for Robert HX175 had taken off from RAF St Davids at 1721 hours on an intended Percussion M3 anti-submarine patrol. 

Similar to No. 53 Squadron, 502 Squadron had an interesting history over the course of the war, flying a variety of aircraft, although all in the anti-submarine role and from bases all over the U.K. In December of 1943 they moved to St David’s in Pembrokeshire, Wales.

Prior to that move, in February of 1943, 502 Squadron converted from flying the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley to the Handley Page Halifax GR (General Reconnaissance) Mk.II Series IA version. According to Wikipedia.net, this was the: “Definitive Coastal Command variant of the GR.II with glazed nose mounting .50 in (12.7 mm) machine gun, Merlin XX or 22 engines, B-P A-type dorsal turret and extra long-range fuel tanks in fuselage. A ventral turret with a single .50 in (12.7 mm) machine gun was mounted on most aircraft although some employed the ASV.Mk 3 radar in its place.”

We know 502 squadron’s Halifax’s were equipped with the ASV Mk. 3 radar dome in the ventral position instead of the gun turret. These aircraft were not fitted with a Leigh Light, but apparently radar and the bright moonlight was used to locate the U-boat.

Again, according to 'U-BOAT VERSUS AIRCRAFT’ by Norman Franks and Eric Zimmermann:

“That evening, U-763 had reached an area west of Bordeaux, but at 2205 she was found yet again, this time by a Halifax (‘R’) of 502 Squadron. By now the flak gunners must have felt like seasoned veterans. The boat’s guns slashed into the approaching bomber which was hit repeatedly and crashed. Again there were no survivors. Seaman Rudi Wieser had been the main antagonist with his 2 cm twin flak gun.”

The squadron’s Record of Events notes simply: “A/C failed to return. No messages received.”

The entire crew of HX175 perished:

Flying Officer Francis Thomas Culling-Mannix, age: 26, RNZAF (NZ.413535), 1st Pilot, Panel 262.

Flying Officer Douglas Emerson Geldart, age: 23, RCAF (J/23869), 2nd Pilot, Panel 246.

Pilot Officer Edmund Legh Woolcott, age: 22, RAAF (A.412046), Navigator, Panel 259.

Warrant Officer Matthew James Fahey, age: 24, RAF (629918), WOP/AG, Panel 213.

Flying Officer Denis Thomas Williamson, age 23, RAFVR (149922), Panel 210.

Warrant Officer Stanley Beaton, age: 27, RAF (817076), WOP/AG, Panel 213.

Pilot Officer Laurence Neill Botsford, age: 25, RCAF (C/85726), Flight Engineer, Panel 249.

Sergeant Cyril Ostler, age: 29, RAFVR (1311159), WOP/AG, Panel 235.

All are inscribed on the Runnymede Memorial, Surrey, England (Panel Numbers noted).

The squadron’s Summary of Events notes that instead of the 250 lb Depth Charges they were carrying 4 600lb A/U bombs and 12 A/U Flares.

U-763’s War Diary describes the engagement as such:

"2016 (position BF 8239) Surfaced to charge and ventilate.

Conditions: NNW 2, Sea 1, 6-8/10, 1033 mb, moonshine, Visibility Good

"Aircraft" action stations occupied immediately. [ES: although they don’t explicitly state so, the gun crews would have immediately inspected and prepared their weapons for action]

Due to the favorable flying weather (bright moonshine) and the nearness of the transmitting location, I decide to confuse the enemy by launching "Aphrodite".

2033 – 2038 3 "Aphrodite" launched.

2102 – 2110 3 "Aphrodite" launched.

2205 (position BF 8319)

"Aircraft". No detection observed, however, "Naxos" Finger checked and gear is operable.  3 flares to port, range = 6000-8000 meters [3-3/4 to 5 miles].  Right next to them an aircraft is immediately distinguished, that could still not have seen the boat, and was not in a direct approach.  Altitude 100-200 meters [328-656 feet], course 150°.  Boat turned hard to starboard, charging cruise not interrupted.  At 1500 meters [1,640 yards, max effective range] fire opened with all barrels.  All weapons are well placed at the target.  Left side engines begin to burn.  Enemy turns away slightly to port and returns fire with the stern turret.  No bombs thrown.  Boat was not overflown.  Further hits were observed in the bow canopy and wings.

2209 Outgoing Radio Message Beta Beta 2210/5/3:

Was attacked by aircraft.  Naval square BF 8319.

"U-763"

2211 (position BF8319)

The aircraft (probably "Liberator", Consolidated 32") [ES: another mis-identification] turned away to port at range = 400 meters [437 yards].  The fire quickly grew larger.  While flying away was still shot at with the twins.  It quickly loses altitude, crashes at 22.11 hours from 50 meters [164 feet] altitude and explodes on impact.

"Shoot down!"  Ran to the shoot down location on course 150° and ahead GF.  Did not secure from action stations.

2228 (position BF8343)

Reached the shoot down location.  Large oil and gasoline slick, part still burning.  Switched to E-motors.  No survivors sighted.  Only one no longer inflated dinghy, a large wheel and small pieces of wreckage.  Continued charging cruise with both diesels.

I am convinced by the experience gained on the previous days concerning enemy locating activity that he works with as yet unknown processes or undetectable frequencies for rough bearing. The "Naxos" brief impulses, which we perceive in the device, he used only to initiate the attack [ES: The Germans noticing the intermittent use of the radar].”

Culling-Mannix and the crew of Halifax ‘R’ for Robert likely never had a chance. While records from the U.S. Naval Observatory confirm it was bright moonlit this night - Waxing Gibbous with 88% of the Moon's visible disk illuminated, U-763 War Diary indicates it was 60-80% cloudy. The U-Boat’s gun crews held their fire as the Halifax closed within lethal range, plodding along trying to reconcile the confusing radar information while they strained their eyes to pick out the U-Boat from the cloud shadows on the sea’s surface. They flew right into a wall of 20mm gunfire before they could even get a shot off from their nose .50 caliber Browning.

U-763 picked up their escort at dawn on February 7th, entered the lock into the harbor at La Pallice at 1230 and tied up to the pier in Bunker SII at 1405. They had been at sea for 55 days and covered 5,070.3 nautical miles on the surface and 897.5 nautical miles submerged.

They actually painted two 4-engine aircraft on the front of their conning tower as “Kill” marks. (see images below)

Cordes own summary of the patrol:

“1. The young crew found their way quite soon after initial weather difficulties with the Atlantic conditions and justified the trust placed in them. The victories achieved in the Bay of Biscay were indeed self-defense, but have greatly strengthened the confidence of the men in their weapons.

2. The changing of the boot routine proved to be expedient only on the long submerged transit into the operations area and on the return journey.

3. When charging in transit in highly air-endangered area, the boat ran with "battle bridge watch" (Watch Officer, Bridge Mate and 6 not alternating lookouts) or with manned "Aircraft battle stations" (18 men on the bridge).  Advantage: (maximum reduction in danger of surprise, fastest and most effective anti-aircraft weapons use) outweighs the disadvantage of not being ready to crash dive when charging transit is necessary.  Bright, cloudless moonlit nights, are very unfavorable because then the enemy can attack the boat entirely by surprise without locating and without searchlight use. In moonless, dark nights with or without clouds the enemy is forced, to locate at an early stage to initiate the attack or to illuminate with searchlights. With occupied "aircraft battle stations" anti-aircraft weapons are fully operational without delay and clearly offer the best chance of firing or causing the enemy to turn away.

4. Transit by day (clear skies) provides, in my opinion best guarantee of not being surprised and should be optional for the Kommandant in all areas. The possibility of monitoring hostile aircraft frequencies would show the boat that other forces had been called and establish the optimum dive time with contact keeping enemies.

5. Own Biscay experience showed that Naxos localizations coincided with sighting the enemy or were reported later when the enemy detected the boat and not the decoy. (see observations of enemy radar use).

6. Fu.M.O. (Hohentwiel experience) could not be made due to lack of operational use in weather area.

7. The existence of a wide variety of noise buoys to deceive or as a lure (launched by aircraft) is very likely. [ES: Throughout the patrol Cordes reports hearing many noises in the U-Boat that they think may be approaching vessels or decoys made to seem like them, but were most likely vibrations and issues with his own boat, which took a beating in the heavy seas.]

8. Taking along a medical rating (boat had a Sanitätsmaaten along) proved to be very useful. The state of health of the crew during the entire patrol was good to very good. (medical examinations were conducted on a regular basis.)”

U-Boat Command’s critique of the patrol:

“The Kommandant was on his first patrol with a new boat, which was mainly set off as weather boat and sighted no enemy vessels.

Combat with the aircraft was tenacious, energetic and skillfully withstood.  Especially recognized is the marksmanship of the anti-aircraft crews who shot down 2 planes, one of which did not even manage to attack.

The Fu.M.O. [ES: “Hohentwiel” search radar] was not used by the Kommandant, especially in the air-endangered areas, because he did not want to reveal himself by the radiation of the device.  This view is fundamentally wrong, especially since the boat was equipped with the first unit of a new and very powerful type superior in range to the instantaneous radar monitoring devices [ES: i.e.; Naxos]. The boat should have urgently collected required front experiences for assessment and further development, only this will bring us forward.

Accredited successes:  2 aircraft shot down.”

U-763 Post-Patrol History

Cordes commanded the U-763 for two more patrols:

1. On March 19th they departed La Pallice for the open Atlantic, but just as they cleared the  Bay of Biscay they were ordered back to base along with U-976, U-960 and U-228 to help form Group “Marder” which command wanted to include 15 boats by May 8th.

They were travelling with U-960 and when they reached the rendezvous with their escorts on March 27th were attacked by 7 fighter bombers. According to U-Boat Command’s War Diary:

“U 960 has 2 seriously wounded, 7 slightly wounded and probably 1 machine shot down.  This shows that these attacks by the enemy are planned.  (see IV d).

IVd) 2 boats, coming into port under escort, were attacked by 6 enemy fighter bombers within sight of the lock.  Because of the elation at home-coming, Flak armament was not in full working order in one boat.  This shows that all Flak guns must be manned and ready to fire until the lock or the harbor boom has been reached.”

U-960 took the brunt of the attack and according to Uboat.net:

“The inbound U-763 and U-960 were attacked by seven Mosquitos (two Mk.XVIII from 618 Sqdn and five Mk.VI from 248 Sqdn RAF) at the rendezvous point with their escort of two Sperrbrecher and four minesweepers off La Pallice. The Tsetse Mosquitos (L for Love, pilot F/O D. J. Turner and HX903/I Item, pilot F/O A. H. Hilliard) strafed U-960 and injured 14 crew, four of them seriously, including the commander with a wound above the left knee. The boat claimed one aircraft probably shot down, but while I Item was indeed badly damaged by a hit to the nose, it managed to reach base. (Sources: Franks/Zimmerman)”

The “Tsetse” Mosquitos were armed with a 57mm Molins gun. This same squadron had attacked and sank U-976 on the 25th as they approached St. Nazaire, killing 4, but 49 survived.

U-763 may not have escaped totally unscathed as there is little mention of her in all of April and most of May until we see she was retrofitted with a Schnorchel underwater-breathing apparatus at the naval shipyard in La Pallice. Some sources state this occurred in April and others between May 20th and June 8th, 1944.

After the D-Day landings in June, all remaining U-Boats were equipped with a Schnorchel which allowed them to operate their diesel engines under water and stay submerged to avoid air attacks. This helped survivability but dramatically decreased their effectiveness and success rate.

2. On June 10th, 1944 Cordes and U-763 departed La Pallice with the intent of operating off the south coast of England and English Channel to counter the invasion. Something happened to damage their periscope and on June 18th they pulled into U-Boat base at Brest to have it repaired. Repairs affected, they continued their patrol on June 20th.

Late in the evening on July 5th they fired torpedoes at Convoy FTC-27, one of which struck and sank the small British steamer Glendinning .

U-763's War Diary is not accessible for this patrol, but fortunately, U-boat Command’s War Diary summarized this patrol:

“11.6. left La Pallice.

18.6. entered Brest to repair periscope.  Aircraft attack while being escorted in.

20.6. left Brest.

22.6. 1926 BF 2579, while ventilating boat with Schnorchel, aircraft sighted in periscope, Schnorchel alarm, then propeller noises increasing in strength - searching group.  

  2240 T5 at destroyer, miss, enemy speed misjudged.

23.6. 0030 BF 2584 single T5 fired at approaching destroyer by hydrophone bearing, miss, range too great.  

  0454 BF 2588 little moonlight, slight sea, 4 aircraft bombs while schnorchelling.  Nothing observed previously in periscope.  Hunted with hydrophones and depth-charges the whole day.

24.6. BF 2589 Schnorchel alarm because of radar intercept.

25.6. At night BF 2647 cloudless, no moon, calm sea, Schnorchel alarm because of searchlight.  A few seconds later 4 aircraft bombs in the vicinity.  3 more later on and at 0408 bombs again while schnorchelling.  

  During passage onward to the E. up to 29.6.  Schnorchel alarm 6 times because of searchlights or bombs nearby.

29.6. 0426 reached operations area ordered (BF 2615). 

  0538 2 destroyers, course W., with circular saw.

30.6. After another Schnorchel alarm because of aircraft sighted in periscope, searching group of 4 destroyers at 1854 in BF 3622.  No chance to fire, as range too great.

  1902 15 twin-engined aircraft.  Alarm.  

  1940 4 depth-charges nearby in BF 3622.  Probably from a small motor vessel.

1.7. BF 3289 Schnorchel alarm because of loud continuous location.  1 depth-charge a very short distance away from the boat, then propeller noises.  Boat bottomed.  Searching group active up above.

3.7. Schnorchel alarm 5 times because of white lights and searchlights.

4.7. Telemotor system out of order.

5.7. After 3 Schnorchel alarms because of locations, search light and propeller noises, destroyer in sight at 1640 in BF 3533.  Then 4 more.  No chance to fire because range too great.  

  1728 convoy a long way off. 

  1803 L.U.T. triple fan at several overlapping ships.  1 hit after 3 minutes 42 seconds heard in hydrophones.  Nothing seen because of dipping.  After 40 minutes wreckage observed in periscope.  Convoy formation in disorder.

  2145 T5 at freighter of 4,000 GRT.  Hit heard after 6 minutes 28 seconds.  

  2200 T5 at destroyer.  Explosion after 10 minutes 30 seconds.  Then a vessel approaching from astern and the start of a hydrophone and depth-charge hunt lasting nearly 30 hours, during which 550 depth-charges were dropped.

7.7. Land in sight.  Boat had unwittingly drifted into Spithead roads.  No patrol or minefields noticed.  Everything as in peacetime.  Ships at anchor were in St. Helens roads.  After spending 24 hours N.W. of Nab Tower, 12 of them N. of Warner Shoal, made off without being detected.

11.7. 2057 in BF 2564 destroyer in sight (belonging to a searching group of 3 destroyers with saws).  L.U.T. double fan.  Hit after 9 minutes 28 seconds.  Nothing seen.  Both torpedoes heard in hydrophones until they exploded.  Cracking and sinking noises.  12 minutes later nothing further seen at periscope depth.

13.7. Entrance report for Brest.  Depth-charges and bombs, some of them well-placed, 6 more times until picked up by escort.  Several Schnorchel alarms because of hydrophone bearings, searchlights and locations."

Command Critique:

Patrol carried out with perseverance and determination.  By comparison with earlier boats, this one encountered much stronger opposition on her way out and in her operations area.  Because of navigational difficulties all fixes were inexact and the boat reached the English coast.  From there she has brought valuable observations for further operations.  Successes recognized:  1 steamer probably sunk; 1 probable hit on steamer; 1 hit on destroyer; 1 probable hit on destroyer.  Commanding Officer will receive the German Cross in gold.  Further experiences:  Schnorchel definitely located, but approach and bombing at night inaccurate.”

Cordes claimed 2 destroyers torpedoed, 1 steamer torpedoed and 1 steamer 4,000 GRT sunk, but in reality they had only sunk the 1,927 GRT Glendinning.

Cordes left the U-763 in August. According to uboat.net:

“Cordes took command of U-1195, another type VIIC U-boat, in November 1944, based first at Kiel for training, and then from January 1945 at Bergen, Norway as part of the 11th Flotilla.

He left Bergen for the English Channel on his first and last patrol in her on 1 Jan 1945. He sank two ships, an unusual achievement at this stage of the war, but went down with his boat shortly after sinking the second, the ex-Cunard liner troop transport HMS Cuba on 6 April. There were 18 survivors from the boat, but 31 men were lost with Cordes. He was 31 years old.”

Uboat.net also notes this occurred: “in the English Channel south of Spithead Roads, in position 50°33'17N, 00°56'09"W, by depth charges (Hedgehog) from the British destroyer HMS Watchman D26 (T/A/Lt.Cdr. J.R. Clarke, DSC, RNVR)”.

“The Hedgehog was a projector-type weapon that throws 24 small projectiles several hundred feet ahead of the attacking vessel. Immediately after entering the water the 32-pound projectiles arm and explode on contact with the U-boat or not until they reach the bottom of the ocean.” So unlike depth charges that were designed to crush or crack the U-Boat’s hull, the Hedgehog rounds were designed to punch holes in the hull leading to rapid flooding.

For a U-Boat officer, Cordes had led a charmed life up to this point with most of the assignments he had earlier in the war keeping him fairly out of danger. His luck finally ran out just weeks before the war ended. He is known to have left behind a wife and son.

On August 23rd. 1944, his old boat U-763 evacuated France for Bergen, Norway under the command of 21-year-old Leutnant Kurt Braun as operations from the occupied French bases became untenable. From there they went to Flensburg, Germany, received moderate damage in a B-24 attack near Bergen.

According to uboat.net, U-763’s final fate was to be: “Scuttled on 29 January 1945 in the Schichau shipyard at Königsberg [present-day Kaliningrad, Russia] because the unseaworthy boat could not be evacuated after being damaged by bombs during a Soviet air raid on 24 January.”

Sources

Common Wealth Graves Commission (www.CWGC.org) for information on casualties relating to this story

Franks, Norman for his books ‘Search, Find and Kill – Coastal Command U-Boat Successes’ (Aston Publications, 1990, ISBN 0 946627 55 X) and ‘U-Boat versus Aircraft’ (Grub Street, 1998, ISBN 1-902304-02-2), co-written with Eric Zimmerman.

Google Sites (google.com/sites) for free Website tools and hosting.

Google Maps (google.com/maps) for free custom map creation tools.

Helgason, Gudmundur for various U-Boat information via uboat.net.

Howard, Dom (www.bombercommandhistory.net) and his amazing website for access to Form 78 Aircraft Movement Card for HF.282.

Imperial War Museum (www.iwm.org) for various images related to this story.

Mason, Jerry (www.uboatarchive.net) for U-763's War Diary and U-Boat Command's War Diaries.

Moore, Graham – for his friendship and trust in me to help tell 172 Squadron’s story to their surviving descendants through his remarkable RAF Chivenor and North Devon Aviation History in World War 2 private Facebook group.

United Kingdom National Archives at Kew – Nos 53, 172 and 502 Squadron Operational Record Books (Summary of Events and Record of Events) and UBAT Report on Rowland's attack.

Wikipedia free on-line encyclopedia for numerous peices of information related this story.